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Implications of Visual Attention Phenomena for Models of
Preferential Choice
Timothy L. Mullett and Neil Stewart
University of Warwick
We use computational modeling to examine the ability of evidence accumulation
models to produce the reaction time (RT) distributions and attentional biases found in
behavioral and eye-tracking research. We focus on simulating RTs and attention in
binary choice with particular emphasis on whether different models can predict the late
onset bias (LOB), commonly found in eye movements during choice (sometimes called
the gaze cascade). The first finding is that this bias is predicted by models even when
attention is entirely random and independent of the choice process. This shows that the
LOB is not evidence of a feedback loop between evidence accumulation and attention.
Second, we examine models with a relative evidence decision rule and an absolute
evidence rule. In the relative models a decision is made once the difference in evidence
accumulated for 2 items reaches a threshold. In the absolute models, a decision is made
once 1 item accumulates a certain amount of evidence, independently of how much is
accumulated for a competitor. Our core result is simple—the existence of the late onset
gaze bias to the option ultimately chosen, together with a positively skewed RT
distribution means that the stopping rule must be relative not absolute. A large scale
grid search of parameter space shows that absolute threshold models struggle to predict
these phenomena even when incorporating evidence decay and assumptions of either
mutual inhibition or feedforward inhibition.
Keywords: attention, choice models, drift diffusion, eye-tracking, gaze cascade
When choosing between alternatives, individu-
als spend varying amounts of time deliberating
over their choice. While doing so they shift their
attention several times between different items
and attributes. Importantly, these shifts in atten-
tion can be used to predict choice, and in recent
years there has been increasing interest in discov-
ering what attentional shifts can tell us about the
underlying decision process (Orquin & Mueller
Loose, 2013). The primary tool underlying this
advance has been eye tracking and a number of
robust phenomena have been identified which link
visual attention to the decision making processes.
The most robust have been the late onset gaze bias
(LOB), sometimes referred to as the gaze cascade
(Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003),
and the mere exposure effect (Bird, Lauwereyns,
& Crawford, 2012). As a result, models have been
formulated with the explicit aim of explaining
these phenomena (Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel,
2010; Krajbich, Lu, Camerer, & Rangel, 2012;
Shi, Wedel, & Pieters, 2013) and debate has per-
sisted over how well existing models cope with
these new findings (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012;
Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; Stewart, Gächter, No-
guchi, & Mullett, in press; Stewart, Hermans, &
Matthews, 2015). In this article we aim to avoid
discussing the relative merits of specific models
and instead focus on more general properties
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which can inform the taxonomy of evidence ac-
cumulation models. Primary among these proper-
ties is the stopping rule: the criterion by which a
model stops accumulating evidence and makes a
response. Specifically, we investigate whether dif-
ferent stopping rules can predict the pattern of
visual attention in decision making.
The mere exposure effect has long been noted
in Psychology and Marketing (Zajonc, 1968),
with consumers generally preferring a product
which they have heard of and is familiar to them
(Fang, Singh, & Ahluwalia, 2007; Winkielman
& Cacioppo, 2001). This is true even if this
familiarity is not accompanied by any knowl-
edge about the product which would be relevant
to the choice (Mandler, Nakamura, & Van
Zandt, 1987; Nordhielm, 2002). Recent studies
have shown that the mere exposure effect is
evident at much shorter timescales and is evi-
dent within deliberation of a single choice (Ata-
lay, Bodur, & Rasolofoarison, 2012). Further-
more, this effect can be used to bias preference.
For example, when a display alternates between
two different faces, individuals are more likely
to prefer the face which was presented for lon-
ger (Bird et al., 2012; Shimojo et al., 2003).
This is true even when exposure time differs by
only a few hundred milliseconds. The majority
of studies and models interpret the bias during
deliberation as showing that individuals accu-
mulate evidence in favor of choosing an item
and that there is a bias toward accumulating
evidence more quickly for the item currently
attended (Armel, Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008;
Kim, Seligman, & Kable, 2012; Krajbich et al.,
2012; Mitsuda & Glaholt, 2014; Noguchi &
Stewart, 2014; Shimojo et al., 2003; Simion &
Shimojo, 2006). Therefore, assuming all items
are positive, if one item is attended for longer,
more evidence is accumulated in its favor and it
is more likely to be chosen. The mere exposure
effect is important for our modeling because all
the models we implement assume faster accu-
mulation for attended items.
The LOB describes the finding that in the final
moments before decision, individuals are far more
likely to be looking at the item they are about to
choose (Shimojo et al., 2003). When this looking
bias is plotted against time it is shown to increase
slowly at first, beginning approximately one sec-
ond before the decision, but then rising rapidly
until the moment the response is made, or very
slightly before (see Figure 1). Crucially, experi-
ments have shown that this is reflective of the
underlying deliberation process (Krajbich et al.,
2012; Shimojo et al., 2003; Simion & Shimojo,
2007). The cascade continues even when the vi-
sual display turns blank, suggesting that shifts in
visual attention reflect covert shifts in the item
currently being considered (Simion & Shimojo,
2007). Furthermore, individuals are not merely
attending to an object as part of planning the
response action, for example, looking left to aid in
pressing the left button. Nor are they simply halt-
ing visual search while they make the requisite
motor response. We know this because the cas-
cade is still present when participants are forced to
look away from the pictures in order to make their
response (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009) and the final
fixation on an item is often shorter than those
preceding it, suggesting it is interrupted by a de-
cision threshold being crossed (Krajbich et al.,
Figure 1. Empirically measured late onset bias during (a) preferential binary choice between
faces (Shimojo et al., 2003); (b) multiattribute choice between 2 apartments each with 5
numerical attributes (Mullett and Tunney, 2016), and (c) choices between two risky gambles
(Stewart, Hermans, & Matthews, 2015). Note that whereas a and b are plotted against time,
c is plotted by discrete fixations.
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2010). In addition, the characteristics of the LOB
react and change subtly depending on the specific
task with the cascade beginning earlier when there
are more alternatives and the choice is more com-
plex (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009; Glaholt, Wu, &
Reingold, 2010; Schotter, Berry, McKenzie, &
Rayner, 2010; Schotter, Gerety, & Rayner, 2012).
This is evident in Figure 1, where panel a comes
from a simple binary choice experiment, panel b
comes from a complex multiattribute decision,
and panel c comes from a risky gambles experi-
ment. Although the three plots have differences,
the LOB has some stable characteristics. It is
characterized by attention being split equally be-
tween items in the early and middle portions of the
trial, before rising during the last moments before
decision and finishing with a bias to be looking at
the chosen item 60–90% of the time, depending
on choice complexity. Furthermore, although it is
not often reported, in our own studies we have
found that the LOB onsets at the same point prior
to decision, regardless of how much time an indi-
vidual has spent deliberating the choice before-
hand. That is, trials with different RTs show the
same absolute duration LOB.
One of the aims of this study is to examine
competing explanations for the LOB. One
prominent explanation is a feedback loop be-
tween attention and evidence accumulation. In-
dividuals are biased to pay more attention to
rewarding items. Therefore, as one item begins
to be preferred, there is a bias to fixate on it
more, which in turn increases the probability of
accumulating evidence in its favor (Glöckner &
Betsch, 2008; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; Shi-
mojo et al., 2003). This explains findings that
the cascade is larger when individuals are se-
lecting the option they like, as opposed to dis-
like (Mitsuda & Glaholt, 2014; Simion & Shi-
mojo, 2006). However, others have suggested
that the bias in looking can be better explained
by the relevance of the evidence to the choice.
In “like” tasks, individuals focus more on the
positive information whereas in “dislike” tasks
they do the opposite (Armel et al., 2008; Meloy
& Russo, 2004; Schotter et al., 2010). More
recent evidence suggests that early in delibera-
tion attention is biased toward the more reward-
ing stimuli, regardless of the current task, sug-
gesting a bottom up effect on attention; then, a
top-down system exerts more control as delib-
eration continues, with attention being biased
toward the item containing evidence most rele-
vant to the current decision task (Kovach, Sut-
terer, Rushia, Teriakidis, & Jenison, 2014;
Schotter et al., 2012). In the case of reject tasks,
attention becomes biased toward negative op-
tions and the gaze cascade is still toward the
item which is selected as the worst. Given the
nuances and complexity of the arguments about
whether positive evidence is always accumu-
lated or whether negative evidence is accumu-
lated in reject tasks as well as effects of bottom
up and top down control, we focus here on the
highly robust effects seen in preferential choices
between positive items. Thus we do not address
what characteristics may be driving the loop but
focus on the more fundamental question of
whether any kind of loop is required, or indeed
capable, of producing the LOB.
The competing explanation for the cascade
effect is that there is no loop, and no exogenous
effects on attention (Krajbich & Rangel, 2011),
with the exception of ignoring eliminated op-
tions (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009; Glaholt et al.,
2010). Instead, attention is allocated randomly
and the cascade emerges because of a funda-
mental property of the decision making process.
This interpretation posits only that individuals
are biased to accumulating evidence in favor of
the currently attended item. Each item has its
own accumulator, which is incremented as more
evidence is acquired and a decision is only
made once a threshold is reached thereby satis-
fying a stopping rule. The LOB is predicted
because evidence is accumulated more rapidly
for the attended item. Therefore, when the
threshold is reached and a response made, it is
more likely that it is the currently attended item
which has just accumulated the requisite evi-
dence. By plotting attention locked to the point
at which a decision is made, one is retrospec-
tively plotting this antecedent shift in attention
and the resulting increased accumulation rates
which caused the choice to be made.
This article examines whether the LOB can be
produced by a model in which attention is not
exogenously controlled and is allocated randomly.
Furthermore, it investigates which stopping rules
can reliably predict a cascade. Most models fall
into one of two categories: relative threshold mod-
els (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Ratcliff &
McKoon, 2008) and absolute threshold models
(Usher & McClelland, 2001). For models using a
relative threshold, each item has its own accumu-
lator and when evidence is gathered for one item
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it increments that particular item’s accumulator. A
decision is made when one item has accumulated
enough evidence to be far enough ahead of the
other. That is, a decision is made when the differ-
ence between accumulators reaches a set thresh-
old. When there are more than two alternatives
then one must start making additional assumptions
about the relativistic comparison (e.g., highest ac-
cumulator vs. 2nd highest, or highest vs. average).
This particular debate is beyond the scope of this
review because we deliberately focus only on bi-
nary decisions (for a discussion see Krajbich &
Rangel, 2011; Teodorescu & Usher, 2013).
In absolute threshold models, each item has its
own accumulator. However, a decision is made
when any one accumulator reaches a set threshold,
regardless of the state of the competing accumu-
lator. Arguably there is more variation between
the many models which employ an absolute stop-
ping rule. These models often posit differing types
of interaction and inhibition between the accumu-
lators or inputs during evidence accumulation (see
Teodorescu & Usher, 2013, for a review). We take
the most common assumptions and functional
forms, then examine their fundamental properties
in relation to the visual phenomena we are mod-
eling. Toward the end of the article we also apply
a very general approach which aims to identify
whether particular assumptions could ever pro-
duce these phenomena.
The simplest absolute threshold model exam-
ined here is the independent race model, where
there is no interaction and the accumulators
simply race toward the threshold (Vickers,
1970). Although useful for illustrating simple
effects, this model is rarely used in choice fit-
ting as it is poor at predicting RT patterns. The
first alternative tested is an assumption of mu-
tual inhibition (Usher & McClelland, 2001).
This describes a model where the total evidence
accumulated for an option inhibits the input to
competing accumulators. As one accumulator
gets close to the decision threshold it is inhib-
iting the accumulation of new evidence for
other items, meaning it is able to increase its
lead even more quickly. This could be a poten-
tial explanation for a LOB. Another possible
assumption is that of feedforward inhibition
(Krajbich et al., 2010; Mazurek, Roitman, Dit-
terich, & Shadlen, 2003; Niwa & Ditterich,
2008; Shadlen & Newsome, 1996). In feedfor-
ward inhibition, the inputs to each accumulator
have an excitatory effect on their own accumu-
lator, but an equal or proportional inhibitory
effect on competing accumulators. This is math-
ematically equivalent to normalizing the values
at the input stage. Interestingly for this study, in
binary choices a model with full inhibition is
mathematically equivalent to a relative thresh-
old model. The relativity is simply implemented
at the evidence accumulation stage rather than
the decision threshold stage: With complete in-
hibition, differences are accumulated directly.
Therefore the simple relativistic rule imple-
mented here can also be represented as a special
case of the feed-forward absolute threshold rule,
where inhibition is 1 and decay is 0.
There are several sections to this article, each
with its own purpose. To begin we use simple toy
models whereby each simulated fixation results in
a one unit increment of evidence. These simplified
models are included to more clearly demonstrate
the effects of differing assumptions. In the first
section we demonstrate that a simple absolute
model is unable to produce the LOB and demon-
strate the reason for this. We then show that a very
simple relative model is able to produce a LOB
even when attention allocation is entirely random.
The second section shows that the results remain
the same when there is only a probabilistic link
between attention and evidence accumulation. In
the third section, we demonstrate the effect of
adding a feedback loop as suggested by several
visual attention models, which actually makes the
model predictions worse. The fourth section ad-
dresses different inhibition assumptions within the
absolute threshold model. It is shown that a simple
mutual inhibition model cannot predict the LOB
and that the feedforward model can produce sim-
ilar results to the relative threshold model, but
only when inhibition is near 100%.
Finally, we present a large scale grid search
of parameter space for a relative threshold
model, a mutual inhibition model, and a feed-
forward inhibition model (see Table 1). The
relative threshold model is able to predict si-
multaneously the qualitative characteristics of
the LOB and many common properties of mea-
sured RT distributions with a single set of pa-
rameters. For the mutual inhibition model, we
find parameter values which can predict the
LOB but also result in unrealistic RT distribu-
tions and we find values which can predict RT
distributions, but fail to produce the LOB. There
is no parameter set which can simultaneously
predict both. We find similar results for the
4 MULLETT AND STEWART
feedforward inhibition model, with no single set
of parameter values which can predict the LOB
and RT distributions simultaneously. This
model in particular we find to be very sensitive
to small changes in parameter values, especially
the level of inhibition.
Simulations
Absolute Threshold Models
The first model reported is that using a simple
absolute threshold with attention having a de-
terministic effect on evidence accumulation.
This simple absolute stopping model is no lon-
ger a serious candidate in the literature. Current
absolute stopping models also incorporate inhi-
bition between accumulators or inputs or both,
and decay or leakage, and trial-to-trial variation
in parameters. These additions are necessary to
capture key results in choice and RT data. We
start with this model, however, to illustrate the
basic problem in producing a LOB. Below we
show that incorporating the additional mecha-
nisms listed above does not allow the models to
capture simultaneously the LOB and even just
basic properties of the RT distribution.
The model assumes that for each fixation, the
attended item has its accumulator incremented
by 1. To set the threshold we used a grid search
to find the parameter that gives a RT closest to
16 fixations. We simulated 100,000 choices and
the LOB was plotted by calculating the propor-
tion of simulated choices where the preferred
item was fixated at each time point, working
back from the moment the decision was made.
Figure 2a shows that this model fails to produce
the classic LOB. Instead of a cascade there was
a bias toward the chosen item which appears to
develop gradually from the beginning of the
choice, then plateaus early on. There is then a
sudden tick up for the very last fixation, with
100% of trials ending while the preferred item is
fixated. The latter is easily explained: because
evidence can only be accumulated for the fix-
ated item the accumulator can only be incre-
mented to cross the decision threshold while the
ultimately chosen item is being attended.
The cause of the long-term bias throughout the
choice is less obvious. To see why this occurs it is
helpful to plot the pattern of the LOB for choices
with different RTs (Figure 2b). This reveals that
for any choice with a given RT, the probability of
having fixated on the chosen item is constant
throughout. Consider a trial where a response is
made after only 10 pieces of information have
been collected. In this case there were exactly 10
fixations and since an accumulator has reached the
decision threshold all 10 must necessarily have
been toward that one item. Therefore there was a
100% chance for each fixation to have been di-
rected to the chosen item. For a choice where
exactly 11 pieces of evidence were accumulated,
one knows that 10 of these must have been di-
rected toward the chosen item. One also knows
that, because of the deterministic nature of the
model, the final fixation must have been directed
Table 1
Summary of the Models Estimated Using Parameter Grid Search
Model Decision criterion Inhibition Decay
Free
parameters
Absolute threshold
(independent
race model)
Evidence for 1 or evidence
for 2 is greater than
threshold
NA NA 2
Relative threshold Difference between evidence
for 1 and evidence for 2
is greater than threshold
NA NA 2
Absolute threshold
with feed
forward
inhibition
Evidence for 1 or evidence
for 2 is greater than
threshold
Input to each accumulator
inhibits the input to
competitors
Accumulated evidence
decays as a
proportion of total
accumulated
4
Absolute threshold
with mutual
inhibition
Evidence for 1 or evidence
for 2 is greater than
threshold
Total evidence accumulated
for an option inhibits the
input to competitor
Accumulated evidence
decays as a
proportion of total
accumulated
4
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toward the chosen item. Therefore, for the first 10
fixations there is a 90% chance that an individual
fixation was toward the chosen item. However,
what is important for the failure to produce a LOB
is that the order in which the evidence was accu-
mulated is irrelevant to the choice. It is not spec-
ified exactly when within the first 10 fixations
attention was directed to the now chosen option.
Only the last fixation is determined, hence the
plateau followed by the sudden tick to 1.
Figure 2b also makes clear that the reason for
the gradual rise in gaze bias at the start of the trial
is simply because of averaging over different
lengths of trials. Trials with longer RTs necessar-
ily involve more fixations toward the nonchosen
item and are included in the averaged LOB before
the shorter RT trials have even begun. As one
moves closer to the decision point, trials with
short RTs and much larger biases begin to be
included in the average. This is why the bias
plateaus 10 fixations before the decision.
Relative Threshold Models
Now we turn to models which assume that
decisions are made using a relative stopping
rule: instead of stopping when either item
reaches a set threshold, the decision depends on
the size of the difference between evidence ac-
cumulated for either item. As this model uses a
different decision rule, one cannot use the same
threshold value as in the absolute threshold—
Figure 2. Average LOB for absolute threshold model (a) and relative threshold model (c).
Also, shown are the patterns of LOB broken down by length of deliberation time (RTs) for
absolute (b) and relative (d). See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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after all a value of 5 for the threshold, for
example, would be the difference in evidence
for a relative stopping rule but would be the
total evidence for one accumulator in an abso-
lute stopping rule. A grid search was again used
to identify a difference threshold of 4 as pro-
viding a mean RT closest to 16. The model
simulated 100,000 choices and the LOB was
plotted by averaging attention over all choices.
Figure 2c shows that the pattern matches the
classic LOB finding. The probability of fixating
the chosen item increases with a convex shape
just prior to the decision being made.
The LOB was then plotted for trials of dif-
ferent RTs. Unlike the absolute threshold rule,
the relative rule could potentially produce infi-
nitely long RTs as a result of random walk
dynamics. However, the probability of observ-
ing longer RTs drops quickly and they are rare
in these simulations. To allow for this we only
plot discrete RTs which occurred in at least 5%
of simulated choices.
Figure 2d shows that the LOB develops with
a very similar time course for all RTs. There
was a slight early bias evident in very short
trials which deviates from the average cascade.
However, this was much too small to be driving
the overall effect and quickly converges to
match the fixation biases of other RTs. Cru-
cially, a pattern of increasing bias was found as
the decision point approaches, regardless of the
trial’s RT. This is because creating a relative
difference between the accumulators requires a
sequential series of fixations on one item and a
decision will be reached at the end of this run.
So unlike the absolute threshold rule, there is a
constraint on the order in which evidence is
accumulated leading up to a response.
Nondeterministic Evidence Accumulation
One may think it possible that these results
are attributable to the improbable assumption of
a deterministic rule linking fixations to evidence
accumulation. Indeed models of evidence accu-
mulation generally predict only a probabilistic
bias toward accumulating evidence for the at-
tended item (Krajbich et al., 2010). To address
this, both the absolute and relative threshold
models were run again, but this time fixating on
an item resulted in a 65% chance of increment-
ing the accumulator for the attended item. In the
other 35% of cases, evidence was accumulated
for the unattended item instead. The bias of
65% was chosen to approximately match the
bias that attention has on evidence accumula-
tion as has been estimated in empirical studies
(Krajbich et al., 2010). Figure 3 shows that the
pattern of results is virtually identical. The only
difference for the absolute threshold model is
that the size of the early bias has been reduced
and the final tick only represents 65% of trials
where the final fixation is on the chosen item.
The probabilistic rule means that the overall
bias effect cannot be more than 65% but it does
not change the underlying reason for the lack of
LOB: the order in which evidence is accumu-
lated does not matter in the absolute threshold
model. For the relative threshold, the results still
show a cascade of increasing bias toward the
chosen item before decision but now the cas-
cade has a maximum bias of 65%.
Biases in Attention Allocation
One common interpretation of the LOB is
that attention is biased toward the currently
favored item, creating a positive feedback loop.
Essentially, as more evidence is accumulated
for an item it is more likely to be attended, thus
producing the LOB in the final moments before
choice when evidence is highest. This is inter-
esting as it is intuitively plausible that an abso-
lute threshold rule could produce the LOB when
combined with attentional bias. Therefore the
modeling approach is applied to test this intu-
ition. The only difference from the absolute
threshold model described in the above model is
in the allocation of attention. In the previous
model this was entirely random and indepen-
dent of previous fixation locations. In this
model the following equation was used:
ProbAttenleft
Eleft b
Eleft bEright b
(1)
where E is the total evidence accumulated for
the left or right items and b is a baseline con-
stant added to ensure that small early biases do
not overwhelm the equation and dictate all sub-
sequent fixations. Within the simulation, Pro-
bAtten is compared with a number between 0
and 1 randomly drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion. If ProbAtten is greater than this number
then Attention is directed toward the left item,
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otherwise it is directed toward the right. The
value of b 3 was used to produce the reported
results, however there is no qualitative change
when b is given very high values.
Figure 4 shows that even with a substantial
attention bias, the absolute threshold decision
model is not able to produce the LOB. When
attention bias is plotted separately for different
RTs, there is a clear increase in the probability of
attending the chosen item. However, this occurs
early on and the effect is still very dependent on
the RT itself. Where there is a long RT, the fixa-
tions must necessarily have been split relatively
equally between the items. Therefore there was
never a large difference between the evidence
accumulated, meaning there was also never a
large attention bias toward either.
Inhibition
A number of accumulator models incorporate
inhibition, whereby the rate of evidence accu-
mulation for any option is directly affected by
the other items available. This is especially rel-
evant here because depending on the specific
implementation of inhibition, these models can
be mathematically identical to relative threshold
models when predicting choice and RTs. That
is, when modeling choice and RTs in a two
alternative decision, they will make identical
Figure 3. Average LOB for absolute threshold model (a) and relative threshold model (c)
when attention is modeled as having a probabilistic bias on evidence accumulation. The
results show no qualitative differences compared to the deterministic rule, even when the
patterns of LOB are separated by RTs for both absolute (b) and relative (d). Note the change
in scale from Figure 2. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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predictions. In this section we explore how at-
tention effects can differentiate between them.
A number of models, including leaky com-
peting accumulators (Usher & McClelland,
2001), assume the inhibition of evidence accu-
mulation is dependent on the total evidence
accumulated for the competing option. That is,
if one option has accumulated so much evidence
that it is close to reaching the decision thresh-
old, it will almost entirely inhibit the accumu-
lation of evidence for the competing option. To
simulate this pattern of accumulation, attention
is randomly allocated on each time step. When
attention is directed at item 1 we implement
evidence accumulation using:
E1AV1
(1A)IE2
T
E2 (1A)V2
AIE1
T
(2)
where Ei is the change in accumulated evi-
dence for item i, Ei is the total evidence accu-
mulated, and V is the value input from the
stimulus. A is the attention bias toward accumu-
lating evidence for the attended item, I is the
inhibition parameter, and T is the decision
threshold. This normalization by the threshold
means that if I  1, when one item has accu-
mulated enough evidence to be half way to the
decision threshold, the input to the competing
item is reduced by 50%. As the simulation uses
the same absolute threshold rule as the previous
models the same parameters are applied. To
demonstrate the qualitative effect of inhibition
most clearly, the parameter I is set to 1.
Figure 5a shows that the resulting LOB
shows a very early rise from chance, followed
by a decline before a rapid rise for the last few
fixations. The reason for this pattern becomes
clear when the plots are split by RT. Figure 5b
shows the gaze cascades when responses are
plotted separately for each decile of RT. For the
quickest responses, there is a very rapid early
rise, then a distinct decline. This is because for
a short RT, early fixations must be significantly
biased toward one item. This item therefore
accumulates a lot of evidence and rapidly be-
gins to inhibit accumulation for its competitor.
When the difference between them becomes
large, the inhibition will be so great that atten-
tion bias is largely irrelevant. This is why the
attention bias then declines closer to chance. In
the case of longer RT trials, fixations are split
evenly between the two options early on, mean-
ing mutual inhibition builds and it takes a run of
quite a few fixations to one item to break the
balance. This is the reason for the earlier onset
of the final increase in bias in longer RT trials.
We also report simulation results for feedfor-
ward, or input inhibition. This refers to a model
where the value input from a stimulus inhibits
the value input from the competing item:
Figure 4. The LOB is plotted for the absolute threshold rule when attention is exogenously
biased toward the currently preferred item. See the online article for the color version of this
figure.
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E1AV1 (1A)IV2
E2 (1A)V2AIV1
(3)
This model has the interesting property that
when inhibition is equal to 1, it becomes math-
ematically equivalent to a relative threshold
model without inhibition. However, the relativ-
ity enters the model at the point of evidence
accumulation, instead of later, at the decision
rule. Our first aim here is to establish whether
both assumptions are able to predict the LOB.
Because of this functional similarity, the same
threshold value of 4 was initially used, however
due to the inhibition term reducing the amount
of evidence accumulated on each fixation RTs
were implausibly long. A threshold of 2 is in-
stead used, though the qualitative results remain
the same.
Figure 6a shows that when inhibition is set to
1, the model produces the desired pattern of a
monotonically rising bias immediately before
choice. Figure 6b shows that some of this is
caused or accentuated by shorter RT trials hav-
ing a higher bias overall. However, this effect is
very different to that found in other absolute
threshold models because in all cases the bias
increases over the final few fixations rather than
being flat and then showing a sudden spike.
Next we examine what happens to the LOB
when inhibition is not equal to one, thus break-
ing the equivalence to relative threshold mod-
els. The reason for this is that empirical fitting
of behavioral data rarely yields such high esti-
mates of inhibition. Therefore, an additional
simulation was performed with inhibition re-
duced to 0.5. Figure 6c shows that the gaze
cascade now looks nearly identical to that pro-
duced by the corresponding model with no in-
hibition at all.
The reason for this large change in the LOB
with partial rather than complete inhibition is as
follows. With complete inhibition (I  1), the
attended and unattended items have their accu-
mulators increased and decreased respectively
by the same amount (in this simulation, by 
0.3 and 0.3). This is analogous to a single
item accumulating 0.6 in a relative threshold
rule because the total evidence accumulated at
any time is zero. However, with partial inhibi-
tion (I  0.5) the attended item is increased by
0.48 and the unattended is also increased but
only by 0.03. Therefore, the model is no longer
equivalent to that of the relative threshold and
because the gain of attending an item is greater
than the penalty of attending its competitor, the
resulting LOB is similar to that of other absolute
threshold models. The plateau pattern is still
evident even when I is large enough for the
unattended item to experience negative accu-
mulation, just so long as this is smaller than the
positive gain associated with being attended. In
fact Figure B1 in the Appendix B shows that
even when I  0.9 there is notable flattening in
the LOB for separate RT trials and when I 0.8
Figure 5. Average LOB for absolute threshold model with mutual inhibition (a) and the
LOBs from the same model when simulations are split into deciles by RT. See the online
article for the color version of this figure.
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the plateau pattern is obvious in the overall
LOB.
Real Time Simulation and Model Tests
The simplified assumption of each fixation
resulting in a single quantum of evidence being
accumulated is useful for illustrating the effects
of differing RTs. However, the majority of drift
diffusion models posit that evidence is accumu-
lated continuously over time and that the accu-
mulation of evidence at each timepoint is biased
toward the item which happens to be currently
fixated (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Kra-
jbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011).
Furthermore, in the models presented up until
this point we have deliberately manipulated as
few parameters as possible so that we can more
easily identify the effect of individual model
properties. However, nearly all models of
choice are fitted with several estimated param-
eters, all of which can interact and may combine
to produce the LOB and RT patterns common in
choice data. The following modeling addresses
both of these issues. First, we assume that evi-
dence is accumulated constantly and over a
series of fixations with varying durations. Sec-
ond, we perform a large scale grid search of the
parameter space to test what proportion of the
Figure 6. The average LOB for an absolute threshold rule with feedforward inhibition when
I  1 (a) and when I  0.5 (c). This shows that when inhibition is high, such a model can
produce the LOB, and mimic the relative threshold rule. In addition, when split into deciles
by RT, the model with full inhibition shows gradual increase in bias across all trial lengths (b),
whereas when I  0.5, the bias is flat within each RT decile (d). See the online article for the
color version of this figure.
11VISUAL ATTENTION PHENOMENA AND PREFERENTIAL CHOICE
potential parameters can predict properties of
the LOB and predict RT distributions that match
those commonly found in empirical studies.
To approximate continuous evidence accu-
mulation the time during deliberation was split
into bins of 10ms. At the start of each choice, a
fixation duration was sampled from the distri-
bution measured in Mullett and Tunney (2016;
See Figure A1 in Appendix A for the distribu-
tion of sampled fixation durations). Attention was
randomly assigned to one of the items and evi-
dence was sampled with an attentional bias for the
duration of the randomly sampled fixation. At the
end of this fixation a new duration was sampled
and attention was again randomly assigned.
We begin with a relative threshold model.
The parameters that are allowed to vary are the
attention bias, A, and the decision threshold, T.
The minimum value for A is set at 0.5, as this
value results in no bias to either option. A value
of less than 0.5 would lead to a bias toward the
unattended item. Thirty potential values of A
were examined, each of which were spaced
linearly between 0.5 and 1. For the threshold
value there is no upper bound therefore a max-
imum was selected that would explore the ex-
tremes of the model’s range. We selected a
minimum of 2 and a maximum of 100. Again,
30 values were selected, equally spaced be-
tween. This resulted in 900 combinations, each
of which were simulated for 33,000 choices.
(33,000 choices is the maximum given the large
computer memory burden of storing the entire
sequence for every simulation.) To enable com-
putational tractability and keep these simula-
tions within the capacity of our equipment, the
simulation would terminate once the simulated
RT was more than 30 seconds. If a decision had
not been reached then a null response was re-
corded.
The large number of parameter combinations
means it is not possible to discuss them indi-
vidually. Therefore we implement a number of
qualitative checks on the predicted LOBs and
RT distributions. These enable us to specify
characteristics which are present in individuals’
behavior and then objectively test which param-
eter sets and which models satisfy them. These
can then be used to partition the parameter
space and report the volume of parameter space
in which our criteria are met (Lee & Corlett,
2003; Pitt, Kim, Navarro, & Myung, 2006). In
total we use five criteria listed in Table 2.
Simulating the relative threshold model shows
that there are parameter combinations which sat-
isfy all five of these criteria simultaneously (see
the first column of Table 3). These are in a small
minority, but the fact that these values are found
demonstrates that the underlying properties of this
two parameter relative threshold model allow it to
simultaneously fit the behavior observed in visual
attention and choice experiments. Figure 7 shows
the gaze cascades produced by a small but repre-
sentative sample of the parameter space, and Fig-
ure 8 shows the corresponding distributions of
RTs. The observable effects are all quite intuitive.
A higher threshold means that responses take lon-
ger and the gaze cascade becomes more stretched
over time as a longer run of samples is required for
an item to reach the higher threshold. Increasing
the attention bias serves to shorten RTs as each
increment of information has a larger effect. It also
increases the magnitude of the bias, but not in a
linear manner because of the properties of a biased
random walk.
Absolute Threshold and Mutual Inhibition
We now turn to models with an absolute
stopping rule, beginning with one that imple-
Table 2
Criteria Used to Test Each Model’s Performance
Criteria
Tests behavioral or
visual phenomena
The attention bias at the time of response is between .6 and .9 Visual
The average bias from the start of the choice until 2 seconds before response is between
.45 and .55 Visual
The mean RT is between 2 and 8 seconds Behavioral
The skewness of the RT distribution is positive and greater than 1 Behavioral
No more than 1% of choices where the model fails to make a response within 30 seconds Behavioral
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ments mutual inhibition. For these absolute
threshold models we allow more free parame-
ters to vary and test a very large number of
combinations. This added complexity allows us
to better represent the general properties of ab-
solute threshold models commonly fitted to be-
havioral data. In total we vary four parameters:
attention bias A, the decision threshold T, the
decay rate d, and the inhibition parameter I. The
decay rate is implemented at the beginning of
each time point using:
EtEt11 dt  (4)
This equation means that when d  1 evidence
decays at a rate equal to the maximum rate
which it can be accumulated. When d 0, there
is no decay at all and perfect responding would
be possible, given enough time. Once the decay
rate has been applied, evidence accumulation is
calculated using Equation 2.
Table 3
Proportion of Parameter Space Which Satisfies
Different Numbers of Criteria for Each Model Type
Number of criteria
satisfied
Relative
threshold
Mutual
inhibition
Feed forward
inhibition
5 2% 0% 0%
4 27% 1% 1%
3 35% 6% 3%
2 26% 15% 16%
1 10% 61% 66%
0 0% 17% 14%
0.5
1
T = 7
A 
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0.
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T = 17 T = 28 T = 48 T = 69 T = 90
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Figure 7. The LOB plots estimated by the grid search of parameters for the relative
threshold rule. Columns list different values for the threshold T, and rows correspond to
values of attention bias A.
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The parameters d and I are all bounded by 0
and 1. Ten equally spaced values were tested,
with these bounds used as the maximum and
minimum values. For A, we used the same
bounds as in the relative threshold model and
tested 10 equally spaced values between. The
parameter T again has no upper bound and as
demonstrated earlier the threshold in an abso-
lute model must generally be higher than in the
relative threshold model, meaning a large value
could be plausible. Simultaneously, the interac-
tion with decay and inhibition will mean that for
certain parameter configurations a very low
threshold could be plausible. To cover these
extremes we always included very small values
of T: 1, 3, and 5. We then set our maximum to
320 and selected 10 evenly spaced values be-
tween 10 and 320. This resulted in 13,000 com-
binations of parameter values and, as in the
relative threshold model, 33,000 choices were
simulated for each.
As the second column in Table 3 shows, none
of the 13,000 tested combinations were able to
simultaneously satisfy all 5 criteria, though a
small number were able to satisfy 4. It is not
possible to simultaneously show the effect of
varying all 4 parameters so instead we present a
series of plots for each parameter. The values of
three out of four parameters are kept constant
and the plots show the cascade and RT distri-
bution for each tested level of the remaining
one. The values of the remaining three param-
eters are selected to present results that perform
well, but their primary purpose is to demon-
strate the effect of varying the parameter of
interest. In all cases we seek to present the
clearest possible demonstration of the effect of
changing the parameter of interest.
In Figure 9 the top two rows show the effect of
changing the threshold when I 1 and the bottom
two rows show the same effect when I  0.
Where I  1 we see the same pattern as in the
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Figure 8. The RT distributions estimated by the grid search of parameters for the relative
threshold rule. Columns list different values for the threshold T, and rows correspond to
values of attention bias A.
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simple example of Figure 5a, where the cascade
initially rises and then falls, before a tick up at the
end. This increase at the end matches many prop-
erties of the LOB, but the model fails because of
the large bias preceding it. The threshold increase
stretches this out over time, but it is always pres-
ent. When I  0 the model can perform reason-
ably well by incorporating decay. This produces
good RT distributions and a rise in the final mo-
ments, without a preceding bias. However, the
model fails because the scale of the decay rate
required to produce the RT distribution results in
100% of attention being directed toward the cho-
sen item. In many cases, it reaches 100% before
the end. In addition the increasing threshold
stretches the LOB to form a gradual rise.
In Figure 10 decay is varied. When decay is 0,
RTs are all very short and the LOB shows an early
rise, then plateau and final sudden tick up. This
becomes smoothed as decay is increased, but at
Figure 9. The top row of panels shows the average LOB produced by increasing the
threshold parameter in a model with full mutual inhibition. The second row shows the RT
distributions for the same models. The lower two rows show the effect of increasing the
threshold parameter when inhibition is set to zero.
Figure 10. The LOB and RT distributions produced by different levels of decay within a
mutual inhibition model. Blank subplots occur for parameter values where too few decisions
were made within the imposed deadline of 30s and therefore results cannot be plotted.
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the same time the duration of the LOB is extended
and onsets earlier than is seen in eyetracking ev-
idence. In addition, 100% of attention must be
allocated to the chosen item for some time before
choice so that evidence accumulation overcomes
the rate of decay. For very high levels of decay the
model fails to reach threshold in nearly all choices
meaning results cannot be plotted.
Figure 11 shows that increasing the size of the
attention bias while keeping all other parameters
constant reduces RT time as the difference in
evidence accumulated for either item at each step
is larger. It also increases the size of the bias at the
point where a decision is made.
Figure 12 displays the effect of increasing
inhibition. This serves to increase RT and allows
the model to produce positively skewed distribu-
tions. However, an early bias toward attending the
chosen item is seen at all levels of I.
Absolute Threshold and
Feedforward Inhibition
When fitting an absolute threshold model with
feedforward inhibition we use the same parameter
values as used for fitting the mutual inhibition
model. Evidence decay was also implemented in
the same manner. However, evidence accumula-
tion was estimated using equation 3. Again, Table
3 shows that no parameter values were found
which satisfied all 5 criteria. Table 4 shows that
the criteria the model particularly struggles with
is the size of the bias in the final moments. To
show the reasons for this we plot the effect of
changing each parameter value as was done for
the mutual inhibition model.
Figure 13 shows that increasing the threshold
increases the average RT, but when the model
contains both decay and inhibition the distribu-
tion of RTs does not become more positively
skewed. The LOB also becomes more elon-
gated, but even with relatively high inhibition
and some decay, the model still produces an
early bias toward the chosen item.
Figure 14 shows that increasing the decay has a
large and pronounced effect. At higher levels the
decay interacts with inhibition so that no choices
are completed, even at low thresholds. High decay
rates can also result in attention becoming biased
toward the competing item before a sudden up-
ward tick marking the onset of the LOB. This is
because the high decay rate combines with the
inhibition to mean there is an almost lexicographic
and deterministic rule of a decision being made
after X samples in a row. Thus for a choice to take
longer than that number of samples attention must
necessarily have been directed to the other item
immediately prior to that run. At lower levels of
decay the LOB onsets early and results in a grad-
ual rise as well as showing a slight plateau at very
low levels, even though inhibition is relatively
high.
When attention bias is low, RTs are all rela-
tively similar because the random allocation of
attention is introducing less variability into the
model. Figure 15 shows that even with a midrange
value for inhibition there is an early bias and no
positive skew in RTs. At higher levels the rela-
tionship becomes more deterministic. Although
the LOB onsets much closer to the end of the
choice there is still slight early bias and the bias at
the time of choice is 100%.
Figure 16 shows that increasing the inhibition
parameter improves the model’s ability to produce
positively skewed RTs with distributions which
match behavioral data. However, this also in-
creases the size of the attention bias at the final
Figure 11. The LOB and RT distributions produced by different levels of attention bias
within a mutual inhibition model.
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moment before choice and the resulting predic-
tions are much more extreme than is observed in
subjects’ responses. Overall these results show
that although there is likely to be a parameter set
where the model can match all of these values, the
region of parameter space where inhibition, decay
and attention bias are balanced is very small. The
variance in parameter values estimated from ex-
isting choice and RT data is larger by at least an
order of magnitude.
Discussion
Simulations of choice times and attention allo-
cation from evidence accumulation models with
relative and absolute stopping rules have revealed
two clear results. First, the simulations show that it
is possible for a model of decision making to
predict the LOB effect without any modulation of
attention or feedback loop. Such a loop may still
exist, but clearly it is not necessary and in some
models including it can actually worsen the mo-
del’s performance. Second, we show that an evi-
dence accumulation model with a relative stop-
ping rule can predict the qualitative patterns of the
LOB and RT distributions commonly found in
empirical data. It does so even when implemented
in the most simple form possible, with no decay or
inhibition. Models with an absolute stopping rule
struggle to explain these effects even with addi-
tional assumptions and free parameters. The re-
sults of simple simulations show that a model with
mutual inhibition fails to produce the LOB,
whereas feedforward inhibition can only do so
when the inhibition is near 1, something not ob-
served in fits to choice and RT data. A large scale
grid search simulating real-time evidence accumu-
lation shows that a relative threshold rule can
satisfy qualitative tests for the LOB and RT dis-
tributions with a single set of parameters. Con-
versely we find no parameter sets which can do so
for the absolute threshold model with either mu-
tual or feedforward inhibition. The manner in
which multiple parameters interact with each
other suggests that a set of values does exist for
feedforward inhibition given a grid search with
very high resolution, particularly when one con-
siders that the relative threshold rule is held as a
special case within the absolute threshold model
with feed-forward inhibition. However, the area of
parameter space is small; much smaller than the
variance generally reported when fitting parame-
ters to behavioral data alone.
Collapsing or Stationary Boundaries
One possibility that we do not directly test is
that of collapsing boundaries. This assumption
is included in a number of relative threshold mod-
els because when evidence for each alternative is
equal, then relative threshold rules can predict
unrealistically long RTs or fail to converge on a
choice at all. Collapsing boundaries address this
Table 4
Proportion of Parameter Space Which Satisfies
Each of the Five Model Criteria
Criteria
Relative
threshold
Mutual
inhibition
Feed
forward
inhibition
End bias .6–.9 20% 4% 3%
Early stage bias .45–.55 85% 21% 23%
Mean RT 2–8s 35% 21% 15%
Positive skew in RT
distribution 77% 18% 12%
99% of decisions made
in 30s 66% 48% 57%
Figure 12. The LOB and RT distributions produced by different levels of inhibition within
a mutual inhibition model.
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problem. We do not examine this subclass of
models here because we show that even the sim-
plest relative threshold model produces a robust
LOB before this additional assumption is in-
cluded. What is particularly interesting though is
that a collapsing boundary can make a relative
threshold rule equivalent to an absolute threshold
rule when predicting choice and RT (Zhang, Lee,
Vandekerckhove, Maris, & Wagenmakers, 2014).
This does not qualitatively change our conclu-
sions, as it of course does not affect the predictions
of the absolute threshold model, while it simply
adds more degrees of freedom to the relative
threshold model. However, it means the LOB
could be used to test for the presence of collapsing
boundaries in future work: a relative threshold rule
with collapsing boundaries would predict a differ-
ent pattern of LOB at different RTs. This is attrib-
utable to changes in the relative impact of the
accumulation process (which is weighted by at-
tention), and the rate at which the boundary col-
lapses (which is attention agnostic) as deliberation
time increases. This effect can also be used in
future development of such models to estimate the
rate at which a boundary may collapse while si-
multaneously estimating, and controlling for, the
biasing effect of attention.
Feedback Loop or Patterns Emerging
From Random Attention?
The reason that the relative threshold produces
the LOB is that a decision is made after several
consecutive incidences of evidence being accu-
mulated for one item. By time locking the analysis
to the point of response, it is necessarily true that
evidence must have been accumulated for the
chosen item in the immediately preceding mo-
ments. If attention biases evidence accumulation,
it must also be true that attention was more likely
to be directed toward the chosen item in those
immediately preceding moments. The apparent
build-up of a bias immediately before a choice
gives a powerful intuitive sense of causality: that a
deliberate, nonrandom shift in attention causes the
resulting decision. However, the results here dem-
Figure 13. The LOB and RT distributions produced by different thresholds within a
feedforward inhibition model.
Figure 14. The LOB and RT distributions produced by different rates of decay within a
feedforward inhibition model. Blank subplots occur for parameter values where too few
decisions were made within the imposed deadline of 30s and therefore results cannot be
plotted.
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onstrate that because the analysis of attention is
essentially retrospective, a truly random assign-
ment of attention still predicts the LOB. In fact,
assuming a direct loop between accumulated evi-
dence and attention does not alter the models’
predictions. These results are consistent with
many recent findings which do not require or
assume any systematic bias in attention (Glaholt
& Reingold, 2009; Glaholt et al., 2010; Krajbich
et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Mit-
suda & Glaholt, 2014). They also support studies
showing that the mere exposure effect does not
require any volitional allocation of attention, and
that it is possible for it to be controlled entirely by
the environment and presentation duration of
stimuli (Bird et al., 2012).
It seems unlikely that attention is entirely ran-
dom, and several patterns have already been iden-
tified (Shi et al., 2013). These include the ignoring
of poor options, seemingly because they hit a
lower boundary of evidence (Glaholt & Reingold,
2009) and modifying attention switching patterns
between items and attributes depending on the
stage of choice process (Shi et al., 2013). How-
ever, these effects would not be relevant in binary
choice. An effect which could present an interest-
ing alternative explanation is that rather than at-
tention being directed more frequently toward the
preferred item, attention lingers for longer every
time a high value item is attended. Analysis of
fixation and dwell durations has indeed shown that
they are longer for preferred items, however this
does not increase over the duration of the trial
(Glaholt & Reingold, 2009, 2011; Glaholt et al.,
2010; Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013). If any-
thing, the effect is most pronounced in the first
fixation and reduced during the rest of the trial.
Therefore without an increase over time it cannot
explain the LOB.
Stopping Rules and Inhibition in Evidence
Accumulation Models
Evidence accumulation models using both rel-
ative stopping rules and absolute stopping rules
have been shown to fit RT and choice data well in
different scenarios (Teodorescu & Usher, 2013).
Some studies have also shown that an attention
weighted relative threshold model can produce the
LOB having been fitted to empirical data based
Figure 15. The LOB and RT distributions produced by different levels of attention bias
within a feedforward inhibition model.
Figure 16. The LOB and RT distributions produced by different inhibition parameter values
within a feedforward inhibition model.
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only on RTs and choices (Krajbich et al., 2010).
However, this is the first attempt to model both
relative threshold rules and absolute threshold
rules and examine their fit to behavioral and visual
phenomena simultaneously. The results of our
grid search analyses show that the relative thresh-
old rule can produce familiar RT distributions and
LOB plots which match those from empirical da-
ta. It is perhaps surprising that it is such a small
proportion of the parameter space which can sat-
isfy all of our qualitative tests simultaneously.
However, as Figure 8 shows, the RT distribution
is always positively skewed and the LOB always
shows a convex rise from a neutral early bias. The
fact that the model can capture these qualitative
patterns with nearly any viable parameter values
shows that a more complex version incorporating
inhibition, decay, or collapsing thresholds would
find suitable parameter values with even more
flexibility to fit behavioral data. In fact prior fits to
eye tracking data have used additional assump-
tions about inhibition (Krajbich et al., 2010).
For absolute threshold models both decay and
inhibition were allowed to vary. This is because
these parameters are crucial to the majority of
absolute threshold models when fitting RT and
choice data. Allowing only the threshold and at-
tention bias to vary would result in us only testing
the independent race model, which is now in-
cluded as a special case when decay and inhibition
are both 0. Within the literature on evidence ac-
cumulation models there is debate about the point
at which inhibition should enter the model, either
as mutual inhibition of accumulated evidence or
as accumulators inhibiting the input to other ac-
cumulators in feed-forward inhibition. We use
simple simulations to show that a mutual inhibi-
tion assumption, based on the total evidence ac-
cumulated, fails to predict the LOB under basic
assumptions. This is because if one item builds up
a large lead the inhibition overwhelms the atten-
tion bias, meaning it is less important which item
is being attended to. A model with feedforward
inhibition, where inhibition acts at the level of
input, performs much better. It can mimic a rela-
tive threshold model very closely when inhibition
is 1, or at least very high. However, this breaks
down quickly as the inhibition parameter is re-
duced to more behaviorally plausible levels.
The large scale grid search shows that both
inhibition assumptions can predict the LOB under
some parameters and can predict realistic RT dis-
tributions under others, but we find no overlap
where either model can predict both simultane-
ously. The fact that the feed-forward model with
complete inhibition is mathematically equivalent
to the relative threshold models means that a grid
search with sufficient resolution would find suit-
able parameters. However, our analyses have
shown that the LOB predictions are very sensitive
to any reduction in inhibition away from its max-
imum value of 1. Finding parameter sets for ab-
solute threshold models at realistic levels of
inhibition seems like a remote possibility. Further-
more, if such a set were found, the proportion of
parameter space occupied must be small as it must
fit in between the nodes of the grid we explored.
Given the scale of variance seen in parameter
estimates from behavioral data, it would be in-
credibly difficult to fit such a model to individuals’
responses.
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Appendix A
Distribution of Fixation Durations Sampled for Simulations
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Figure A1. A histogram showing the distribution of fixation durations measured in Mullett and
Tunney (2016) and sampled from during real-time simulations.
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Figure B1. This shows the LOB for an input inhibition model. Plot a shows the average
LOB for a value of I  0.8 and plot b shows the LOBs separated by decile of reaction times.
Plots c and d show the same for a model where I  0.9. See the online article for the color
version of this figure.
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Correction to Mullet and Stewart (2016)
In the article “Implications of Visual Attention Phenomena for Models of
Preferential Choice,” by Timothy L. Mullett and Neil Stewart (Decision, Ad-
vance online publication. February 1, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
dec0000049), the copyright should have been “© 2016 The Author(s)”. The
author note also should have included the following license statement “This
article has been published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unre-
stricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited. Copyright for this article is retained by the
author(s). Author(s) grant(s) the American Psychological Association the ex-
clusive right to publish the article and identify itself as the original publisher.”
The online version of this article has been corrected.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dec0000062
